IPR policy for Public Good orgs

In the context of a widening and deepening university-industry interface, there has been a significant rise in industrial consultancy assignments, contract research, sponsored collaborations, and creation of cross-functional, multi-disciplinary teams with university and industry participation.

A prerequisite for a harmonious working relationship between industry and academia is a clear, cogent and transparent framework for ownership of the new or original knowledge for fair sharing of benefits resulting from the commercial or business application of the research results of their joint endeavours. In a close working relationship, the collaborating partners need to freely share their respective knowledge, information and resources. To sustain creativity and innovation in such a working paradigm, using the system of intellectual property rights (IPRs) for fair and equitable sharing of benefits of new or original knowledge is a dire necessity in today's environment. This requires a paradigm shift in the value system of researchers in academic institutions. Only then can they hope to learn the art of maximizing value creation and realize tangible financial benefits from their intellectual assets.

The primary aim of an institutional IPRs policy is to create an enabling environment that recognizes and values creativity and innovation, and simultaneously assists in translating these in an orderly fashion into products, processes and services for the widest public good. Further, it helps to create an ambience that promotes and nurtures the emergence of new ideas, new lines of enquiry and research, scholarship and its practical application for solving technological problems; and this, in turn, promotes the emergence of the leaders and innovators of tomorrow.
In simple terms there are two ways by which economic benefit can
be attained 1. is by reducing costs 2. by increasing selling price. In this example it should
be noted here that there is a distinct difference between the farmer and the consumer ( in
this case any one who buys food from market). ICAR as a part of its mandate or even
fundamental duty should work towards raising the economic status of the farmer. In order
to do this the method to be adopted is only the first line of approach (is by reducing costs
incurred by the farmers) and on the other hand any increase in the selling prince will reflect and be borne by the consumer who also in this case is the taxpayer and by definition and in
principal is a stakeholder of the council. The conflict will arise here if the farmer uses
protected technology there by increasing cost of production (licensing will be forced to
increase selling price) and this cost will be reflected on the selling price and in turn on the
consumer. This will present a scenario wherein the stakeholder will be paying the price
for the technology developed essentially through his/her funded money.
In another more relevant scenario as described below :
1. A scientist of ICAR ( for example a farm machinery and power scientist)
develops a farm implement which is a low cost alternative or a costly method of
sowing or fertilizer application ( again this a hypothetical example)
2. The scientist applies for a patent and gets it
3. Then the council or the organizational unit (OU) ( Institute ) gets the licensing
rights
The OU here sells the license to single manufacturer
The manufacturer sells the fabricated machine (in this case the low cost seed drill or
fertilizer drill) to the farmer at a price which includes the licensing costs
Here again the stakeholder (the farmer in this case) will have to pay for the technology
which has been in principle developed by his /her own indirect funding
The other scenario is the OU sells the license to multiple manufacturers
Then the fabricated machine is sold at a competitive price (A manufacturer at X price and
B manufacturer at Y price etc.,) here we can a see a situation wherein some manufacturer
may compromise with quality to reduce price. In this scenario again the stakeholder
(Farmer) will pay for the technology which ethically he/she should be getting for free and
more so he / she may get a low quality machine
Both the above scenarios presents a situation wherein the stakeholder pays in terms of tax
to the govt which finds it s way as the fund for ICAR and also he/she pays for the
technology which is developed by his /her own funding. In more simple terms: we take
money form X develop a technology with that money and sell the technology back to the
same X
This could actually put us at odds with those for whom research is meant to serve.
In this context I trust I don’t have to go in to the details of the classical example of
mismanagement of public IPR: take-over of Golden Rice by AstraZencea ( I trust you
are fully aware of the details of the case ie Trojan trade reps )
The draft can have some very specific provisions to prevent such situations from
occurring this could be possible done by detailing a course of action when the costs of
handling or maintaining the protected IP surmounts or supersedes the monetary liability
of the org (ICAR) .
Suggestions
1. It would be useful if IPR subsidising can be given to the farmers and efforts can
be made to include this in the green box as genuine research expense which
essentially means that we should be able to subsidise a protected IPR technically
and also lobby in the WTO to get it included in the green box. This I say because
we (INDIA) cannot possibly give subsidies (In fact If I am right we are not close
to the permitted limit which we can actually give that is to say our green box has
still some empty space) as given by the EU and US in terms of money but we can
definitely increase and thereby fill our green box by giving IPR subsidies to the
primary stakeholders. These methods would involve mo monetary liability if the
IPR is generated by the council but whereas in case we buy the IPR and are
committed to forward it to the stakeholders them a difference method can be
worked out. VIRTUAL SUBSIDY
2. A clear cut limit on the basis of monetary liability may be set to the technology
patent and a policy of forced licensing introduced in case the org ( ICAR) sees a
threat of stakeholder conflict or Torjan trade rep situation.
3. What can and should be patented (at least a broad pre patent categorization may
be annexed)
4. A policy can be formulated to decide as to what should be licensed and what
should not be after obtaining of the patent. This way the IP of the inventor is
protected and at the same time ethics and morals of public good is followed ( eg
An inventor of low cost seed drill will get his due IP protection and by not
licensing or by subsidising the license the stakeholder is also protected )